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The study of altruism is a cornerstone of modern evolutionary biology. Associated with 
foundational questions about natural selection, it is often supposed that understanding biological 
altruism is key to understanding social behavior more generally. Moreover, philosophers and 
biologists alike have suggested that explaining biological altruism can provide clues—or more 
than that—about the nature of sociality and norms in humans (FitzPatrick, 2016). For these 
reasons, traits that are regarded as altruistic, such as sterility in worker ants, warning calls in 
macaques and blood sharing in vampire bats, are among the best-known and most studied 
behavioral phenomena.  
Typically, the central question about altruism in biology is put in something like the following 
way: Given that natural selection is a process in which fitter traits become more prevalent, what 
explains the continued prevalence of organisms that “donate” fitness to others? How could natural 
selection favor organisms that appear to regularly sacrifice their own survival and reproduction for 
the sake of others? When first introduced to this problem a common initial reaction—often 
voiced, e.g., by students in introductory courses—is to object to, or at any rate to wonder about, its 
anthropomorphic ring, embodied in terms such as ‘donation’, ‘sacrifice’ and, ultimately, 
‘altruism’ itself. The ready answer, as anyone who has studied the topic even at an elementary 
level will know, is that biological altruism is defined in non-psychological terms. As Samir 
Okasha (2013) puts it: “In evolutionary biology, an organism is said to behave altruistically when 
its behaviour benefits other organisms, at a cost to itself. The costs and benefits are measured in 
terms of reproductive fitness, or expected number of offspring”, Okasha goes on to clarify: “For 
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the biologist, it is the consequences of an action for reproductive fitness that determine whether 
the action counts as altruistic, not the intentions, if any, with which the action is performed.”  
This idea, that biological altruism is purely an effects-based, behavioral notion, devoid of 
psychological or intentional content, is widely accepted among biologists and philosophers of 
biology. Our main goal in this paper is to challenge it: We argue that seemingly “dry”, behavioral 
definitions of altruism carry a vestige of the psychological concept familiar to us from the human 
domain. Statements like Okasha’s notwithstanding, whether an action is seen as altruistic is not 
simply a matter of its consequences for survival and reproduction alone; the identification of a 
behavior as altruistic, we will show, relies on an implicit attribution of intentionality, in the form 
of assumptions about which of the interacting organisms is the “initiator” or “author”, of the 
interaction. In effect, designating a behavior as altruistic assumes that organisms (in general) can 
be seen as agents, in a fairly rich sense of the term. We aim, first, to show that this is the case. 
And, second, to raise doubts about whether the relevant notion of agency can be cashed out in an 
acceptable way. If both parts of this argument are successful, it calls for a substantial rethink of 
the notion of biological altruism.  
The issue we have in mind is perhaps best approached in the following manner. In any two-
way biological interaction with fitness consequences, there are three possible generic outcomes: 
Either the fitness of both parties increases ([+,+]), or both suffer a decrease in fitness ([-,-]) or, 
thirdly, one interactant’s fitness increases while the other’s decreases ([+,-]). Cases of altruism fall 
into the latter category, of course. But altruism is not alone in this. Crucially, behaviors of the 
“converse” sort, i.e. apparently antagonistic interactions such as predation and parasitism, are also 
plus/minus interactions. To distinguish these from altruism one must go beyond sheer fitness 
consequences. One must find a rationale for thinking of one of the interactors as “contributing” 
fitness to its partner—a case of altruism—or as selfishly “extracting” fitness from the partner.  Put 
differently, to designate an interaction as altruistic (or selfish) is to implicitly assume an 
active/passive distinction. If the fitness benefits accrue to the active side, the behavior is selfish. If 
the active side loses fitness, it is altruistic. Our question, then, is what makes it the case that an 
organism should be seen as active, with respect to a certain gain or loss of fitness.  
We start by looking at relatively simple definitions of altruism, and relatively simple 
exceptions to them. These present substantial, though not overwhelming, challenges to the 
concept of altruism. We discuss some potential solutions, noting their benefits and drawbacks. But 
the primary significance of this discussion is that it clarifies and clears the ground for harder cases 
– ones in which we think a subtler notion of organismal agency is at play. 
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These harder cases are also very important ones, pertaining to social insects. This is no doubt a 
key taxon for the study of social evolution. In particular, the phenomenon of worker sterility has 
been perhaps the most widely studied altruistic trait, and has been seen by many as a make-or-
break case for theories of the evolution of altruism.1 But we show that it is not straightforward to 
justify thinking of sterility as altruistic on the part of a worker ant (or bee), as opposed to an 
instance of selfishness on the part of the queen. More specifically, to make such a designation one 
must appeal to a more fundamental distinction between actors and recipients – one must first 
decide who the actor is, and only then can one ask whether the actor acted altruistically. We 
examine the relevant notion of actorhood and suggest that it is hard to make good sense of it.  
A couple of preliminary remarks will help clarify our aims and assumptions. First, we assume 
that whether or not the organisms in the examples discussed below have the capacity to form 
intentions and execute deliberate action is irrelevant to our analysis. For, as noted, biological 
altruism is assumed to be independent of actual intentions. Even if some non-human organisms 
are capable of intentional action, models of biological altruism are supposed to apply far more 
broadly, potentially to any organism – including insects, bacteria and plants. ‘Biological altruism’ 
is meant to name the very same phenomenon across all these contexts (Bourke, 2011; Dawkins, 
1976; Lewens, 2015; Okasha, 2013). 
Second, our discussion, as should be clear, is centered on behavioral traits. General questions 
arise in this context – importantly, one can ask after an account of the notion of a trait: Which 
effects or dispositions of an organism count as its traits (as opposed to mere by-products)? How 
does one individuate a trait? Must traits be modular? Must they be products of evolution by 
natural selection? (Wagner, 2001) While we think these are important philosophical questions, we 
will not address them in a general manner here, as they go well beyond our main focus. We think, 
at any rate, that any reasonable stance on traits and their individuation will leave our core 
argument intact. 
Third, when discussing behavior and its evolution, it is common to speak in terms of 
strategies—rather than particular actions—as the objects of selection. “[A] ‘strategy’” says John 
Maynard Smith “is a behavioural phenotype; i.e. it is a specification of what an individual will do 
in any situation in which it may find itself” (Maynard Smith, 1982, 10). In this sense, a strategy is 
 
1 This is not to say that the idea that worker ants are altruists is universally accepted. A well-known 
paper by Nowak, Tarnita, & Wilson (2010) questions whether social insects display altruism (as well 
as the kin selectionist framework within which this phenomenon is often studied). But this is an 
exception; by and large social insects are seen as a major case of altruism. There are very few, if any, 
biologists who take altruism seriously as a biological phenomenon and do not regard social insects as 
one of its key instances.  
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a function from situations to actions describing what the organism is expected to do in each of 
them. We are not critical of the concept of a strategy per se. We do not view this concept as 
intentional or as otherwise problematic (Birch 2017, §1.5). But our focus is on actions, i.e. the 
constituents of strategies. Our claim, seen from this perspective, concerns how actions are 
assigned to organisms: What makes a given action the action of this organism rather than that 
one? This is a more basic question than specifying strategies, since strategies are made up of 
actions. In other words, if actions cannot be assigned to organisms in a satisfying manner, then 
neither can strategies. Consequently, and for the sake of simplicity, our discussion is conducted in 
terms of actions, avoiding the notion of a strategy.  
Fourth and finally, it is possible to restrict altruism, by definition, to interactions among 
members of the same species (Bertram, 1982; Hamilton, 1963). Some of the problems we discuss, 
especially in the earlier parts of the paper, will be obviated by such a move. But not all. Be that as 
it may, we think a definitional restriction to conspecifics is unreasonable. For one thing, it has 
possible exceptions (Pitman et al., 2017). For another, it is unclear why altruism should be so 
restricted while selfish interactions, such as predation and parasitism, are not. Lastly, it is often 
claimed that a prediction of kin selection theory, perhaps the central framework for theorizing 
about social evolution, is that inter-specific altruism should not exist. In accordance, the empirical 
finding that altruism towards members of different species is rare can be taken as evidence for kin 
selection (Bourke, 2011, 71, 76-77; Foster, Wenseleers, & Ratnieks, 2006). If altruism is 
restricted to conspecifics by fiat, then the fact that it occurs exclusively among conspecifics cannot 
play this evidential role. Thus, we proceed by assuming that even if (as seems likely) altruism in 
fact occurs primarily between conspecifics, that is not a fact that we should rely on in spelling out 
what altruism is. 
 
2. Effect-Based Definitions: (Relatively) Simple Issues  
We begin, as noted, by discussing problems that pose relatively mild challenges to the standard 
definition of altruism. The goal, to be clear, is to problematize the concept of altruism – 
specifically, to show that it is not a straightforwardly “austere” concept – it is not merely a matter 
of the loss and gain of fitness, but rather embodies intentional intuitions and descriptive habits. 
Usually, biological altruism is defined simply as an interaction in which one organism 
increases the fitness of others at its own expense. For example, Bourke (2011, 28) says: 
Altruism is defined as the social action in which the actor (or altruist in this 




Likewise, Lewens (2015, 146) writes: 
A biologically altruistic behavior is usually understood by evolutionists to be 
one that augments the ability of others—call them “recipients”—to survive and 
reproduce, while damaging the survival and reproduction of the organism 
producing the behavior—call it the “actor”. In other words, altruistic behaviors 
increase the reproductive fitness of recipients while reducing the reproductive 
fitness of actors. [Italics and quotes in original]  
 
Very similar definitions are given by other prominent philosophers and biologists, including 
Hamilton (1963), Trivers (1971), E.O. Wilson (1975),  Dawkins (1976), Maynard Smith (1980), 
Hoffman (1981), Kitcher (1998), Sober & D. S. Wilson (1998), Godfrey-Smith (2013) and 
Okasha (2018). 
It should be noted that, as the quotes from Bourke and Lewens demonstrate, even simple 
definitions of biological altruism are typically couched in terms of an ‘actor’ and ‘recipients’. In 
later sections we will discuss this distinction in detail. For now, however, we proceed as if it is 
clear – the actor is the focal organism which “performs” or “exhibits” the behavior in question.  
A first, relatively minor issue with these austere definitions is that they count accidental fitness 
contributions as altruistic. If a deer slips into a pit, a wolf may obtain an easy meal. In falling, the 
deer increases the fitness of the wolf at its own expense. The fallen deer may also increase the 
fitness of other deer which thereby avoid becoming the meal themselves. Nonetheless, the fallen 
deer would not be classified as altruistic toward the wolf or its fellow deer. Conversely too: 
Suppose that while worker ants construct a nest, a rainstorm erupts and the ensuing flood destroys 
the fruits of their labor. Here, the ants’ efforts don’t actually contribute to the fitness of the queen, 
and hence cannot be considered altruistic according to the simple definition. However, the 
building of a nest by worker ants is seen as altruism par excellence. Thus, a definition that focuses 
on an interaction’s sheer fitness profile does not align with behaviors regularly thought of as 
altruistic (J. Wilson, 2002).2 
A possible amendment is to require that altruistic acts contribute to the recipient’s fitness in the 
majority of cases, on average, in greater probability, etc. But this restriction helps only slightly. 
 
2 It may be said that in these cases it is intuitively clear that the deer’s falling is not an action or a 
behavior, but merely an extrinsic accident that befell it. Likewise, it seems eminently intuitive that the ants’ 
action—building a nest—was disrupted by bad luck, an event outside of their control. Such intuitive 
descriptions rely on a notion of actor’s control – to be discussed at length later in the paper.  
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Systematic, highly probable non-altruistic fitness donations are ubiquitous. Most sea turtle 
hatchlings making their way to the ocean are devoured by predators, such as seagulls and herons, 
while still on the beach. But it hardly makes sense to consider that a display of altruism on behalf 
of the hatchlings. Similarly, slower deer that fail to escape predators increase the fitness of 
predators (as well as that of their fellow deer) at their own expense, but it would be inapposite to 
regard this as altruism by the deer. Finally, it is perfectly possible that in some environments most 
ant nests are swept away by rainstorms; yet that would not lead biologists to classify worker ants 
as non-altruists.3 
 
3. A More Teleological Approach?  
A purely effect-based definition faces serious counter-examples. This suggests that altruism 
involves something beyond strictly facts about fitness effects. It is not enough that one side gains 
and the other loses: altruism involves a directed donation of fitness. In other words, there is some 
sense in which altruistic acts are geared towards, or aimed at, increasing the fitness of their 
partners. Intuitively, in cases of deer falling into pits or escaping too slowly, the beneficiary gains 
a fitness advantage “for the wrong reasons”: The deer do not “aim” to aid the predator. If 
anything, the opposite holds – there appears to be a sense in which such non-altruistic sacrifices 
for the sake of others are unintended or misdirected, and it is this sense, we think, that drives the 
judgement that these cases aren’t bona fide altruism.  
In view of problems like this, J. Wilson (2002, 87) suggests the following definition: 
An organism’s behavior is biologically altruistic if and only if it is 
directed towards another organism with the goal of providing a benefit 
for that organism and where that benefit would have a propensity to cost 
the acting organism. [emphasis added] 
 
Unfortunately, Wilson does not precisely define ‘goal’. The most common way of 
understanding  goal-directedness in this context is as signifying that the organism tends to reach 
the same end result (the goal) under different conditions, typically due to internal mechanisms that 
 
3 A more general concern is that these points reflect problems in the concept of fitness, rather than 
altruism. Indeed, fitness, and especially its connection to accidents and other chance events, raises vexing 
issues (Griffiths, 2008). But these are orthogonal to the claim we are making: if accidents affect deer 
survival and reproduction systematically, then surely they count toward deer fitness, and our point stands. 
If they don’t, then such accidents are irrelevant for evolution, and a fortiori the interactions at issue are 
neither selfish nor altruistic. Either way, the question we are raising is separate from general worries about 
chance and fitness.  
7 
 
adjust its behavior given prevailing conditions (Boorse, 1976; Enç & Adams, 1992; Nagel, 1977). 
So understood, Wilson would say that an organism is altruistic when it adjusts a self-sacrificing 
behavior according to the context, so that overall its recipient benefits regardless of changing 
conditions.  
This successfully resolves the issue of accidents. A fallen deer does not have the goal of 
conferring benefits on the wolf – it does not adjust its behavior to achieve that outcome. 
Moreover, given Wilson’s definition, a prey’s inability to avoid predation isn’t an act of altruism 
towards predators. If anything, a slow-fleeing deer has the goal of escaping; it simply fails to meet 
that goal in this instance. Conversely, according to Wilson, behaviors can be seen as altruistic 
even if they do not benefit the target. Workers constructing a nest have the goal of providing 
shelter to their nest-mates, whether or not they are struck by a storm or get consumed by an 
anteater in the process.  
However, the goal-directedness definition too faces problems. Most seriously, the definition 
countenances behaviors of hosts towards their parasites. For example, by taking care of the 
cuckoo chick, the warbler’s goal is to benefit the chick: the warbler reaches the same end result – 
an adult cuckoo – despite changes in conditions. Moreover, the behavior of the warbler tends to 
reduce its own fitness, since attending to the cuckoo’s chick comes at the expense of its own 
offspring. Wilson acknowledges that his definition of biological altruism includes parasitism and 
that restricting the definition to intraspecific instances doesn’t resolve the problem; he is willing to 
bite this bullet, since, in his view, the behaviors of hosts involve a recognition error (e.g., the 
warbler misrecognizes the cuckoo as its own chick).  
We think this particular bullet may perhaps be bitten, but it would then be hard to swallow. For 
there are many cases of parasitism which do not involve a recognition error. We illustrate using a 
case that will recur later in the paper, involving the terrestrial drumming katydid (or the oak bush-
cricket; Meconema thalassinum). Being unable to swim, the katydid typically hops away from 
ponds. But upon digesting parasitic hairworms, nematomorphs of the Paragordius tricuspidatus 
species, the katydid jumps straight into ponds and immediately drowns. The parasitic hairworms 
then burst out of its body and into an aquatic environment required for their reproduction (Biron 
et al., 2005). Such “suicidal” behaviors on the part of hosts are quite common. If the host’s 
behavior has a goal, it is to allow for parasite reproduction, by immersing in water. Yet such 
interactions are standardly seen as parasitic, and so as selfish, rather than involving altruistic self-
sacrifice. This seems to us fatal to Wilson’s suggestion: operating with a definition of altruism 
that applies to such a paradigmatic case of selfishness all but erases altruism as a distinctive 
behavioral category.  
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To be sure, more can be said about goal attribution in biology. A direct response to our last 
analysis is that we’ve attributed goals incorrectly. Perhaps hosts like the katydid do not have the 
goal of benefitting their parasites but are “manipulated” into doing so. Such descriptions are fairly 
common in the parasitology literature. Their underlying rationale seems to concern behavioral 
control: To say that an organism has been manipulated is to say that its behavior has somehow 
been subverted; control of its actions has been wrested from it by means of deceit. In section 5 we 
discuss the notion of control in some detail, identifying significant problems with it. But before 
we get there, we will consider the possibility of cashing out the teleological component of 
biological altruism using a selected-functional definition. 
 
4. Appealing to Selected Functions? 
Jonathan Birch (2017) has recently suggested that altruism should be defined, in part, by 
refernce to a trait’s adaptive history (see also West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007). Birch’s full-blown 
definition of altruism is relatively complex. For our purposes we analyze this simpler formulation 
he provides (Birch 2017, 23): 
A behavior is altruistic if and only if it has, in recent history, been maintained by 
selection because of its positive effect on the reproductive success of other organisms, 
and despite its negative effect on the reproductive success of the actor.  
 
As with a definition that appeals to goal-directedness, characterizing biological altruism in 
terms of adaptation removes the difficulties associated with accidental fitness benefits and 
predation. However, even if altruism is defined as an adaptation, this does not block the inclusion 
of parasitism. Generally speaking, parasite-host interactions evolve through natural selection 
because they benefit the parasite and despite decreasing the fitness of the host. Thus, assuming a 
Birch style definition, it should be seen as altruistic.  
Let us spell this out a little further, since the point is relatively subtle. There is no doubt, we 
take it, that parasites like the hairworm benefit from the relevant interactions, and that they have 
been selected to so benefit. One way to look at the situation—the common way, to be sure—is to 
treat this benefit as deriving from the active, “manipulatory” behavior of the parasite. This results 
in classifying the behavior as selfishness on behalf of the parasite. But we can also focus on the 
host, and ask about its causal contribution to the evolution of this interaction. Here, we can break 
down the question in two, relating to origin and maintenance.  As regards origin, it may seem that 
the parasite is justifiably treated as in the driver’s seat: Isn’t it exploiting a vulnerability on the 
part of the host, e.g. a vulnerability of the katydid’s nervous system, that allows the parasite to 
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cause it to jump into ponds? Perhaps, albeit absent detailed information about the mechanisms 
underlying the interaction, it is hard to be certain.  
That said, our main point concerns the maintenance of parasitic interactions. For once we 
attend to maintenance, we must ask after the selection pressures on the host side: Why have hosts 
not evolved mechanisms to block the parasite? Why do they “allow” the parasite to “exploit” 
them? Indeed, this is a salient question for parasitologists. Moreover, Birch’s definition directs us 
to these questions, for it explicitly requires that selection operated to maintain the altruistic 
behavior in recent evolutionary history.4 
Now, very often, the answer to such questions is given in terms of the costs to the host – 
evolving the appropriate defenses is not worth it, in fitness terms (Poulin, Brodeur, & Moore, 
1994). In other words, the maintenance of the host’s vulnerability to the parasite is fitness 
enhancing on average, relative to evolving the necessary defense mechanisms. Thus, in many 
cases, selection has indeed maintained the host’s behavior “because of its positive effect on the 
reproductive success of other organisms [i.e. the parasite] and despite its negative effect on the 
reproductive success [of the host]”. Therefore, it can readily be fitted into Birch’s definition, with 
the result that (at least some) hosts qualify as altruistically benefitting their parasites. We think 
this is an unacceptable result, one that threatens to empty the notion of altruism of explanatory 
content.  
It should be noted that Birch does not consider parasites, in this context. West, El Mouden, & 
Gardner (2011, 236), who offer a very similar definition of altruism, dismiss the idea that hosts 
can be regarded as altruistically helping parasites. They suggest that the behaviors in question, i.e. 
those that hosts exhibit towards their parasite, were selected for in contexts where they are 
adaptive to hosts. Thus, in effect, parasites “exploit” a pre-existing behavioral adaptation of the 
host. Such a claim arguably holds for the warbler-cuckoo system, assuming the cuckoo “exploits” 
a behavior that warblers have been selected for exhibiting towards their own offspring. But this 
does not work in general: The katydids’ jumping into water has not, as far as is known, evolved in 
a context where it was adaptive to katydids. Indeed, katydids have stayed away from water unless 
parasitized. We conclude that appealing to selection history will not solve the problem. 
 
 
4 Birch adds this requirement for good reasons: both general considerations having to do with function 
ascription (Godfrey-Smith, 1994) and because, typically, questions about an altruistic trait’s 
maintenance are the most pressing ones. Furthermore, essentially the same argument applies to similar 
definitions of altruism that take adaptation into account, e.g. West et al.’s (2007) definition in terms of 
current selection pressures.   
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Here is where we have arrived in our overall argument: Some plus-minus interactions are 
described as selfish while others are taken to be altruistic. We have asked what distinguishes the 
two sorts of cases. Is there some identifiable feature of the situation that merits our attribution of 
intentional-like behavior, such that the minus side should be seen as “contributing” fitness to the 
plus side, as opposed to the plus side “extracting” fitness from the minus side? We have looked at 
a number of suggestions for such a feature—systematicity of effects; goal-directedness; selection 
history—and found them all wanting. Our next step is to examine the actor/recipient distinction. 
We suggest that while this distinction may appear clear, it is in fact blurry and anthropomorphic. 
 
5. Altruism and the Actor/Recipient Distinction 
As we’ve noted—and as quotes brought above demonstrate—definitions of altruism are often 
explicitly couched in terms of an actor/recipient distinction. With such a distinction in place, it is 
straightforward to define altruism: An organism behaves altruistically if it acts in a manner that 
results in a loss of fitness and thereby increases the fitness of a recipient. This can be seen by 
examining the following table (Table 1), due originally to Hamilton (1964), but now very 









As can be seen, the table embodies an asymmetry: A social interaction’s fitness profile alone 
cannot tell us whether it qualifies as “nice”—altruism or mutual benefit—or as “nasty”—
selfishness and spite. One must also place it in the right column, i.e. decide which party to the 
interaction is the actor and which is the recipient. In particular, both altruism and selfishness have 
the same fitness profile (+/-). What distinguishes them is that in altruism the benefits accrue to the 
recipient whereas selfish actors benefit themselves.  
Our discussion so far has effectively assumed that the “actor” is simply the organism that 
appears to be performing the behavior in question (see Section 1; West et al., 2007). But this leads 
to trouble, as appearances can readily mislead: Why not view the katydid as “performing the 
behavior” (in which case its behavior would be altruistic)? We need a better way of understanding 
Table 1. Hamilton's four-way scheme. [+] and [-] signs indicate 
whether the organism gained or lost fitness in the interaction. 
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the idea that in an interaction among organisms one side is an actor while the other is a passive 
recipient. Specifically, we need a criterion that allows us to classify “bad” cases, like the worm-
katydid, as instances of selfishness, and “good” cases, like social insects (discussed below), as 
involving altruism.  
  
5.1.       Actors and causal control 
An intuitive sounding suggestion is that being an actor is being responsible for an outcome. We 
can put the resultant criterion roughly as follows. An individual is an actor, relative to a focal 
action, in virtue of exerting causal control over said action. This idea has echoes in philosophical 
discussions of agency in general (G. Wilson & Shpall, 2016), namely, that a behavior stems from 
the individual, and/or its parts, and in this sense is under its control. Samir Okasha, for example, 
considers the contrast between “an insect colony’s moving when it swarms with its moving when 
displaced by a hurricane. In the latter case, external factors wholly account for the movement; in 
the former, external factors, for example, ambient temperature suitable for swarming, are at most 
background conditions. Thus swarming is something that the colony does, not something that 
happens to it” (2018, 12). Okasha regards such cases as illustrative of “a minimal notion of 
agency” which is “no doubt hard to make precise” (ibid). 
Such a minimal notion may well suffice for some purposes, including those Okasha puts it to 
use for. But we do not think it will do in the context of distinguishing altruism from selfishness. 
That is because in many social interactions both sides of a behavioral interaction can and do exert 
causal control. Thus, both will be deemed actors, and we will not be able to place them in 
Hamilton’s table.  
Consider, for instance, a worker ant’s sterility. There are several sorts of mechanisms 
responsible for sterility, but none of them appear to match the idea that control, understood 
causally, resides with the worker. For example, in some species, workers have fully functional 
ovaries, but sterility is maintained by primer pheromones released by the queen or by other 
workers (Conte & Hefetz, 2008). In other species, outside temperature or nutrition at the 
embryonic, pupae and larval stages prevent offspring from developing functional ovaries 
(Abouheif & Wray, 2002; Khila & Abouheif, 2010). In such cases, arguably, whatever determines 
the ambient conditions (perhaps Mother Climate) is in control. It is not the worker-to-be. Other 
cases exhibit an even greater mismatch with the idea of worker control. For instance, in some ant 
species the queen fertilizes worker eggs with sperm from other species, while the eggs of winged 
queens are fertilized with sperm from conspecifics (Cahan & Vinson, 2003). If inter-species 
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hybridization reduces workers’ fecundity, then sterility appears partly under the control of the 
queen, and partly, perhaps, of males of a different species (!). Finally, in some ant species, 
workers may manage to lay male eggs, but these are eliminated by nest-mates (Ratnieks & 
Wenseleers, 2008). Clearly, in such cases workers do not control their fertility—they do not 
“actively forgo” reproduction—rather, their offspring are eaten. Hence, according to the empirical 
evidence, workers generally do not causally control their behavior.5 The upshot is that sterile 
workers, a paradigm case of altruism in the biological world, cannot be regarded as altruistic. 
Perhaps it could be argued, in response, that even if sterility is not entirely up to workers, they 
still “actively acquiesce” in the external factors that cause it (see Bourke, 2011; Ratnieks & 
Wenseleers, 2008). On this view, the only thing that the above discussion shows is that sometimes 
all parties to a given social interaction should be seen as actors. This way, even if the queen 
selfishly induces workers’ sterility, they are still altruistic. But the move looks less appealing as 
soon as we recall the need to maintain parity between parasitism and altruism. Why not treat 
parasitic interactions in the same way? In “allowing” themselves to be “exploited”, cannot hosts 
be equally seen as actively acquiescing in a parasite’s manipulation – and hence as altruists? In 
other words, if the requirement of parity is heeded, this route too leads to a collapse of the 
altruism/selfishness distinction. 
Perhaps, then, we should opt for a subtler causal criterion. Birch (2013) makes such a 
suggestion, relying on the concept of systematic counterfactual dependence (Lewis, 1973). 6 The 
idea, in essence, is that control amounts to fine-tuned causal dependence: if both the cause and the 
effect have multiple possible states, and if particular states of the effects are counterfactually 
dependent on particular states of the cause, then the causal relationship in question is fine-tuned 
(or specific). The claim, then, is that if there exists a specific causal relation then we can speak of 
 
5 We could have extended the discussion to the [+] side of workers’ behavior, e.g. constructing the nest 
or rearing the queen’s brood. To the best of our knowledge, workers do not have primary causal control of 
these behavioral traits as well. That said, since there is no biological altruism without costs to fitness, it 
suffices for our argument to show that workers do not have causal control over the [-] side of the 
interaction. 
6 Birch in fact aims to account for a somewhat narrower notion: genetic control over an organism’s 
behavioral strategy. He does so by restricting the cause side of the relevant causal relationship to genes, 
and notes that these do not directly control an interaction’s outcomes, but rather the ways in which an 
organism responds to behavioral stimuli (i.e. it is a strategy, in roughly the game theoretic sense). Our 





control. Thus, a worker ant has control over her sterility to the extent that sterility exhibits 
systematic counterfactual dependence on her bodily and/or behavioral states, i.e. her influence on 
these outcomes exhibits substantial specificity. 
Will this subtler notion of control do the trick? We think not. For, as with the simpler causal-
control criterion, both sides of an interaction may have substantial and, in particular, fine-grained 
influence on it. Indeed, we think this isn’t a superficial or coincidental aspect of the phenomenon. 
Since social interactions often result from, and are maintained by, co-evolutionary processes, we 
should expect each side to have relatively fine-grained influence. We should expect that, say, both 
the queen and workers-to-be will have evolved in incremental, interdependent ways; to the extent 
that one of them can exert fine-grained control over sterility, so will the other. More concretely, 
while we are not aware of any direct empirical findings as to Birch-style control, the mechanisms 
discussed above—pheromones, nutrition, “policing” of eggs etc.—are such that it is hard to see 
how there would be far greater control on one side of the interaction. For instance, in a 
biochemical reaction, typically both reagents (say a pheromone and receptor) can be tweaked to 
affect the rate, efficiency, side-products and other properties of the reaction. And in the course of 
a co-evolutionary process, such changes are to be expected. A situation in which only one side’s 
influence evolves to be highly specific represents a fairly remote possibility.  
In sum, the simple as well as the more sophisticated notions of causal control are both ways of 
fleshing out the idea that the actor is the individual who exerts primary influence over an 
interaction. While this sounds intuitive, further scrutiny reveals that such a criterion cannot 
distinguish biological altruism in the right way.  
 
5.2.       Actors, unity-of-purpose and inclusive fitness 
The next and final suggestion we’ll consider has a more abstract character – operating in terms 
of the overall characteristics of the organism in question. In particular, the idea is to understand 
actors as a kind of biological agent, where an agent is understood to be a system that maximizes 
inclusive fitness (IF) in a unified manner. We will explain this suggestion and its rationale. But we 
will ultimately argue that it too fails: The appeal to IF generates a regress, since IF itself rests on a 
prior notion of actorhood. 
The appeal to unity-of-purpose, like the notion of internal control discussed above, has been 
central to philosophical discussions of action and agency. Indeed, on some philosophical accounts, 
unity or integration is the defining feature of being an agent (Bratman, 1987; Korsgaard, 1989; 
Hyman, 2015). The intuition, echoing ideas that may be familiar from the human context, is that for 
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something to be an agent it needs to display internal coherence; its parts must “work together” 
towards a common end. At a minimum, there should not be a substantial degree of conflict among 
a system’s activities – their ends must be compatible with one another. This is why we have 
difficulty assigning agency in cases of split personality, or even in cases where someone appears to 
be “pulled in different directions” (Sinnott-Armstrong & Behnke, 2000).  
So the idea would be that an individual is an actor with respect to a given behavior if and only if 
they display agency with respect to that behavior. In turn, they would display agency if and only if 
the behavior coheres with the individual’s unified overall purpose. The question that immediately 
arises is this: If such a criterion is to be applied in a biological context, how should we understand 
purpose, so as to judge whether there is unity-of-purpose? Okasha, following Hamilton and the kin 
selection tradition, asserts that in social interactions the answer is to be given in terms of IF: 
Organisms are unified-in-purpose to the extent that their various traits and behaviors contribute to 
an increase in IF.  
Now, an organism’s IF is comprised of the sum of two components: direct and indirect. The 
direct component refers to the organism’s contribution to its own offspring; the indirect component 
relates to its contribution to the production of offspring by other organisms, weighted by their degree 
of genetic relatedness. Crucially, IF is regarded as the quantity that organisms are selected to 
increase, in any type of social interaction. Specifically, selfish behaviors increase IF via the direct 
component, while altruistic behaviors increase IF via the indirect component. Put differently, for 
the IF of selfish organisms, the direct component is positive and the indirect component is negative; 
for the IF of altruistic organisms, the reverse holds. 
The basic idea behind this explanation for altruism is that while an organism may suffer in terms 
of its own survival and reproduction (i.e. its direct fitness) by performing an “altruistic” act, its IF 
will rise if the act bestows sufficient benefits on closely related individuals (i.e. on its indirect 
fitness). Thus, organisms’ traits can be seen many times, and perhaps especially in cases of 
“altruism”, as “working together” towards the end of greater IF. 
Taking the example of worker ants, here is how the notion of unity-of-purpose might be invoked 
to save the concept of altruism. Sterility, along with many of its other physiological and 
morphological traits, raises the worker’s IF by increasing its contribution to the reproductive output 
of its genetic relatives (despite the decrease to its own reproductive output). So the ant’s traits can 
be said to “work together” to increase its IF. According to Okasha’s view, since sterility belongs to 
a set of traits which together conduce to the IF of the workers, it supplies a ‘rationale’ for the 
behavior of the worker, grounding its status as an agent. In contrast, when an organism’s traits are 
misaligned in terms of their contribution to IF, we have disunity-of-purpose, and so cannot ascribe 
15 
 
agency to the organism in question. Such is the case, for instance, in parasitic manipulation: The 
katydid’s jumping into the water decreases its IF and therefore it is disunified-in-purpose with the 
katydid’s other traits. Consequently, the jumping cannot be seen as a means to increasing the 
katydid’s IF. If anything, the jumping coheres with the parasite’s goal, inasmuch as it increases its 
IF. Thus, we cannot treat the katydid as an agent with a unified purposeful activity, but we may treat 
the hairworm as-if it were a purposeful manipulator. 
As these examples illustrate, behaviors classified as altruistic are associated with unity-of-
purpose, hence agency, since they lead to an overall increase in IF. In the worker ant, a host of 
adaptive features—sterility, life history, various behavioral traits etc. —are aligned, jointly 
contributing to its IF. In contrast, in parasitic interactions unity—and therefore agency—break 
down: Promoting the parasite’s survival and reproduction runs counter to many of the host’s other 
traits. Thus, it appears that viewing control/actorhood in terms of unity-of-purpose may well allow 
us to distinguish altruism from antagonistic interactions like parasitism. 
But this appearance is misleading – unity-of-purpose does not supply a sound basis for 
distinguishing altruistic actors from passive recipients, because unity-of-purpose, it turns out, relies 
on that very distinction, generating a regress. To see this, let us look more closely at how IF is 
defined. Okasha quotes Hamilton’s original definition: “[T]he personal fitness which an individual 
actually expresses … once it is stripped of all components which can be considered as due to the 
individual’s social environment … then augmented by certain fractions of the quantities of harm 
and benefit which the individual himself causes to the fitnesses of his neighbours … The fractions 
in question are simply the coefficients of relationship.” He then adds: “This definition sounds 
complicated but the underlying idea is simple, namely to re-assign all fitness components to the 
actors that cause them.” (2018, 119-120). Thus, to calculate an organism’s IF one must identify, for 
each fitness contribution, which organism is “the actor that causes it”. This, we suggest, lands us 
back where we started, i.e. in need of an actor/recipient distinction; it renders the appeal to IF and 
unity-of-purpose unhelpful for the problems we raise. 
To clarify, suppose we are looking at two organisms – a hungry vampire bat, which failed to 
gain a blood meal on its own; and a satiated next mate, which, having hunted successfully, shares 
food with the hungry individual. Suppose, for the sake of this discussion, that the successful 
hunter suffers a decrease in reproductive output while the reproductive output of the hungry bat is 
increased. Here, if we assume that the successful hunter is the actor controlling these effects and, 
further, that they are selected for by kin selection, then we may regard the successful hunter as an 
altruist. If, for some reason, we wished to regard the other (hungry) individual as the actor, i.e. as 
in control of the fitness effects, then we should regard the interaction as selfish (i.e. the hungry bat 
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would be exploiting its nest mate). What we cannot do, on pain of double counting, is to assign 
the effects of the behavior to both of them. The crux for our purposes is that the decision as to 
which individual to attribute the effect to rests on a (logically) prior decision as to which 
individual is in control of this effect. Or, in other words, on which side is the actor. This decision 
will, of course, determine whether the interaction is altruistic or selfish. Recall the example of 
sterility of workers in social insects. In order to count as a contribution to the workers’ IF, causal 
responsibility for sterility should reside in the workers themselves. Yet, as we saw, it is hard to 
make a case for that. Sterility is, to a large extent, induced by the queen and/or by other workers. 
It follows that we cannot incorporate sterility into the worker’s IF – it is not something the worker 
is causally responsible for. But if sterility cannot be weighted into a worker’s IF, we cannot 
classify it as altruistic.7  
 
5.2.1.       Linear regression to the rescue?  
Here we must look at a relatively technical, but important potential rejoinder.8 It has been 
implied that the issue we just raised, concerning the need to independently specify actor and 
recipient, is obviated when IF is calculated via a linear regression equation. For example, in 
describing the regression method for calculating IF, Gardner, West & Wild (2011) say that it 
can be used to “reassign the indirect fitness effects to the actors responsible for them” (ibid, 
1024). If this is right, then applying regression analysis circumvents the need to presuppose 
who the actors for a given effect are; the regression analysis tells us who they are.  
However, the idea that the regression method in and of itself yields information about the 
causal structure of social interactions is unconvincing. The key point is that the output of a 
regression analysis is a set of correlations. And, famously, correlations always require further 
assumptions if they are to be given a causal interpretation – which is necessary to establish an 
actor/recipient distinction. To bring this out, we rely on recent work by Benjamin Allen, 
Martin Nowak and E.O. Wilson (2013). The concerns motivating Allen et al. are related but 
somewhat different from ours.9 However, we can adapt their critique to our ends. We do so 
 
7 Grafen (2006) provides a related defense for agential thinking in evolution. He demonstrates that, 
under certain assumptions, organisms are expected to behave as-if trying to maximize their own IF. 
This work has been taken as a formal justification for the use of intentional terms like ‘altruism’ 
(West et al., 2011). However, as Grafen’s analysis critically relies on the concept of IF, and thus 
presupposes a notion of actor’s control, it leads to the same regress we have seen.   
8 We are grateful to a reviewer for this journal for pressing the matter and pinpointing its exact 
relevance.  
9 Allen et al. (2013) aim to undermine certain claims made about the explanatory power of the 
regression approach to inclusive fitness theory; our concern is the idea of altruism. We should also 
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while avoiding technical details – for those interested, Marshall (2015) provides a helpful 
introduction. 
The regression approach effectively re-frames the concept of IF in terms of partial 
regression coefficients (Birch & Okasha, 2015). This means that the causal definition of IF 
seen earlier—“re-assigning all fitness components to the actors that cause them” —is in 
effect replaced by a correlational definition.  
Recall that IF has two components: a direct component, accounting for the organism’s 
contribution to its own reproduction, and an indirect component, accounting for its 
contribution to the reproduction of others. This definition is causal: an organism’s IF only 
takes into account effects for which it is causally responsible. In comparison, in the 
regression-version of IF, the direct component becomes the partial regression of an 
organism’s genotype on its own fitness (controlling for the genotype of its social partners); 
the indirect component becomes the partial regression of an organism’s own genotype on the 
fitness of its social partners (again, controlling for their genotype), weighted by relatedness.  
The results of a regression analysis, which define IF in the correlational sense, are 
sometimes interpreted in the causal sense. For example, according to such an interpretation, if 
the “direct” component is statistically negative, that is, if there is a negative partial regression 
between an organism’s genotype and its own fitness – this is taken to imply that this genotype 
causally reduces the fitness of those who express it. However, as Allen et al. (2013) show, 
such implications depend upon prior assumptions about the underlying causal scenario. In the 
present context, this means that inferring which organism is the actor and which is the 
recipient is a matter of extra-statistical interpretation. To show this, we adapt one of their 
examples, showing that the same regression results are compatible with (a) a scenario in 
which “altruism” (in the causal sense) is present and (b) a scenario involving “exploitation”.  
Assume a simple case with a locus involving two alleles – A (marked in blue in Figure 1) 
and B (marked in grey). The frequency of A is increasing from one generation to the next (from 
3/8 to 4/8, Figure 1, upper left panel). In order to quantify the contributions of the “direct” and 
“indirect” components to this increase in A, we conduct a regression analysis. We have all the 
necessary data: We know the genotype of each individual, the fitness of each individual, and 
we also know who interacted with whom (Figure 1, middle panel). Notably, the data 
themselves do not include any information about the causal structure of the interactions. The 
 
note that the example we adapt is used by Allen et al. to show that regression analysis approach to IF 




results of the regression show that the “direct” component is negative, while the “indirect” 
component is positive (Figure 1, rightmost panel). This means that carrying allele A is 
statistically associated with lower personal fitness, and with having partners with higher fitness. 
If the results of the regression are taken to correspond to a causal definition of IF, this behavior 
is classified as altruism; hence, this methodological procedure supposedly allows the 









Figure 1. Different causal scenarios may lead to the same regression results. The frequency of the blue allele increases 
from the one generation to the next (top panel). We construct two hypothetical causal scenarios that underlie this increase 
(bottom left panel): [+] and [-] signs indicate whether the organism gained or lost fitness; arrows indicate social interaction; 
red numbers indicate the total number of offspring. In the first scenario there is food “sharing”, while in the second scenario 
there is food “stealing” (see text for details). The data needed for a regression is extracted and arranged in a table, leaving 
out any information about the causal structure of the interactions (bottom middle panel). The results of the regression show 
that the “direct” component associated with the increase of the blue allele is negative, while the “indirect” component is 
positive (bottom right panel). If the results of the regression are taken to correspond to a causal definition of IF, this 
behavior is classified as altruism. Such an interpretation suits the first scenario, but not the second. Adapted from Allen et 
al. (2013).  
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For our purposes, we now further assume the overall fitness consequences of each 
interaction are also given (marked in [+] and [-] signs): We know whether each organism 
gained or lost fitness due to the interaction. All the social interactions involving A are [+,-] 
interactions. To be clear, the pattern of fitness consequences is not a part of the input of the 
regression. The data used in the regression omit such causal information. This is why the 
regression results are compatible with different causal scenarios, as exemplified next (see 
also Figure 1).  
Let us imagine an environment in which food is scarce. Alleles A and B affect behaviors 
relating to food, and thus have an important effect on fitness. 
First Causal Scenario: “Altruism”. The individuals expressing allele A forage alone, but 
they subsequently seek out other individuals, and share with them the food they found. If they 
meet other A-individuals, they share more food. Individuals expressing allele B also forage 
alone, but in contrast to A-individuals, they save all the food they find to themselves. Under 
this scenario, the negative “direct” component found in the regression results from A-
individuals losing fitness by “donating” food; the “indirect” component is positive because 
the “donation” provides excess-benefits to other carriers of the allele. In this case, individuals 
expressing A-allele drive the relevant fitness outcomes, and interpreting A as an allele for 
“altruism” suits the causal structure of the interaction.  
Second Causal Scenario: “Exploitation”. There is no food sharing, but rather theft. 
Everyone tries to steal food from their social partners. But, in each interaction which involves 
stealing, only one side is successful. Individuals expressing allele A are better thieves, but 
those expressing allele B are excellent at defending their food. Thus, B-Individuals are never 
the victims of theft. As A-individuals are poor defenders, the organisms they encounter might 
steal their food. Notably, this time, the negative “direct” component found in the regression 
results from the fact that A-individuals are the target of “exploitation”; counter-intuitively, the 
excess benefits of being better at stealing (from other carriers of the allele) is captured in the 
positive “indirect” component. In this case, interpreting A as an allele for “altruism” seems 
less suitable than interpreting it as intra-specific parasitism.  
Thus, we see that different causal scenarios are compatible with the same regression 
coefficients. As demonstrated, the fact that a spreading allele is statistically associated with 
having lower personal fitness and higher partners’ fitness does not, as such, entail that the allele 
induces “altruistic” behavior; for instance, it is also possible that the allele induces parasitizing. 
The upshot is that the regression approach to IF does not obviate the need to decide, 
independently of the regression, which side is the actor and which is the recipient. What is 
21 
 
more, in our simplistic scenarios, it might seem like there is an answer to the question “who is 
the actor”, but using the regression method may get it wrong. We should stress again that we 
think that in many actual cases, there is no “right” answer. In such cases, trying to “re-assign 
fitness effects to the actors which caused them” may be impossible in practice.  
All told, we have seen that classifying an interaction as altruistic presupposes that we can tell 
which of the interacting organisms is the actor. We are deeply suspicious of this notion, and we 
think we’ve exhibited why: It is very hard to find a principled way of apportioning causal 
responsibility such that one side of an interaction comes out as “in control”. The suggestions we 
have looked at—and we are not aware of further alternatives—are both conceptually problematic 
and do not match the empirical realities underlying plus-minus interactions.  
 
6.     Concluding Remarks 
We have argued that the distinction between altruism and other plus-minus interactions 
presupposes an intentionalist conception of animal behavior, standard definitions notwithstanding. 
This makes it difficult to tell apart altruism from accidental transfer of fitness and from seeming 
mistakes. A more acute problem is that absent a way to distinguish an “actor” in a social 
interaction from a passive “recipient”, we cannot differentiate between altruism and selected-for 
antagonistic interactions, such as parasitic manipulation.  
Attempts to define a relevant notion of agency face substantial conceptual problems and fail to 
align with the mechanistic facts regarding causal responsibility. It is also worth noting that the 
cases we have discussed are not borderline or marginal cases by any means. Indeed, they are 
absolutely central to the study of altruism. Moreover, similar problems are to be expected in many 
other cases, because the idea of one-sided control of a social interaction is implausible to begin 
with, given the complex nature of these interactions and the fact that they result from subtle co-
evolutionary dynamics.   
If our arguments are correct, there appear to be three paths forward. First, it is possible that a 
clear and general criterion for distinguishing actors from recipients will be found. We are not 
optimistic in this regard, but we cannot, of course, rule out such progress in advance. 
Interestingly, Wyatt, West, and  Gardner (2013) have recently suggested that the actor/recipient 
distinction is, to an extent, subjective – although their considerations differ from ours. These 
authors posit that, at least in some contexts, a modeler may have a choice between allowing 
individuals of different species to be the “actor” and the “recipient” with respect to each other, and 
between restricting actor/recipient relations to members of the same species. Such a choice, in 
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turn, determines whether or not a behavior is seen as inter-species (versus intra-species) altruism 
within an inclusive fitness framework. 
A second path is to eliminate the category of altruism altogether. In some ways, this is the most 
natural response to our argument. But there are definite costs associated with such a move: 
Altruism has generated a lot of important and exciting research. What shall we do with this body 
of work if we cease to recognize altruism as a bona fide biological kind?  
A third response is to view altruism and research into it in a less objective light. Perhaps 
treating a social interaction as altruistic carries heuristic value? Perhaps it is a sound employment 
of the intentional stance (Dennett, 1989; Kornblith, 2002)? We are open to heuristic uses and to 
related projectivist, as it were, construals of the notion of altruism. Nor does our argument imply 
that all plus-minus interactions should be handled similarly. That said, it is unobvious why 
thinking about an interaction between, say, a worker ant and its queen, as altruistic is of greater 
heuristic value than thinking of it as a case of parasitism (where the queen exploits the worker). 
While we cannot enter into an extended discussion of this issue here, we surmise that both 
altruism and selfishness can be utilized in a productive heuristic manner, depending on the 
context. 
Whatever one makes of these options, we hope to have shown that the notion of altruism 
suffers from a foundational conundrum, threatening its cogency and continued use. We think more 
work can and should be done to clarify these issues.  
 
